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ABSTRACT 
 
 Over 48 million end users worldwide utilize cable modems as their means of 
accessing the Internet at high speeds.  The United States accounts for 54% of those users.  
Networks which provide access via cable modems utilize Data Over Cable Service 
Interface Specifications (DOCSIS) as their means of network management.  As 
availability to the Internet increases (especially at high speeds supported by broadband 
access), so does the opportunity for malicious activity against users utilizing the Internet.  
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are one form of malicious activity and one of the most 
common.  In commonplace Ethernet-based wired networks, a DoS attack requires 
relatively high levels of computing and network resources to successfully deny service.  
In DOCSIS-based networks, high levels of computing and network resources aren't 
mandatory in order to sufficiently degrade a network segment, especially when the 
objective of the attack is to reduce the quality of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 
sessions.  This phenomenon hinges on the Media Access Control layer protocol 
employed by DOCSIS used for managing access to the upstream transmission medium.  
Utilizing NS, a discrete event network simulator, we define and analyze a DoS attack that 
specifically targets DOCSIS-based networks.  The attack consumes a small portion of the 
downstream bandwidth available over a cable network but can severely impact upstream 
performance.  While the DoS attack can have any objective, we focus on an attack on 
best effort VoIP sessions.  The implications of this phenomenon are widespread as end 
users looking for cost-saving voice telecommunications services migrate to best effort 
VoIP such as provided by Vonage.  The contribution of this research is the formulation of 
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a DoS attack that exploits the relatively inefficient upstream channel in a DOCSIS system 
and analysis of the attack which explores the impact of the two attack parameters on 
VoIP performance.  Those two attack parameters are the number of nodes attacked and 
the frequency at which each node is attacked.
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INTRODUCTION 
 In the mid-1990's, the cable industry launched an effort to create a set of Data 
Over Cable Service Interface Specifications (DOCSIS). The goal was to provide a set of 
standards in which cable modems and associated hardware could be engineered and 
manufactured by various companies while maintaining interoperability among one 
another. In March 1997, the main specification work for DOCSIS 1.0 was completed. 
 Since the inception of DOCSIS 1.0, the cable broadband access market has 
witnessed unprecedented growth. In February 2007, U. S. broadband penetration reached 
80.16% among active Internet users [“U. S. Broadband Penetration Breaks 80% Among 
Active Internet Users,” 2007].  Of those users, 41% utilize cable modems as their means 
of obtaining high-speed Internet access [“DSL overtakes Cable in the U. S.,” 2006].  As 
the availability and usage of high-speed broadband access increases, so does the demand 
for broadband applications, such as Voice over Internet Protocol, also increases.  VoIP 
usage is projected to reach 12.1 million subscribers by 2009 [Meckler, 2004].  While the 
majority of telephony service provided by cable service providers generally uses the 
DOCSIS QoS mechanisms (and is therefore isolated from a DoS attack), a growing 
amount of  best effort VoIP is also utilized.  The driver for best effort telephony from 
companies such as Vonage is cost. 
 With the number of households that utilize broadband access and VoIP services 
reaching such remarkable levels, the opportunity for malicious activity against those 
households, at a minimum, increases at the same rate. Malicious activity occurs in many 
different forms.  In this study, we focus on malicious activity which inhibits authorized 
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users from utilizing network resources and services.  This form of malicious activity is 
referred to as a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.  In wired networks such as switched 
Ethernet, a DoS attack would need a node or group of nodes capable of producing 
sufficient levels of network traffic to saturate the network and successfully deny service 
to users of that network segment. 
 In this thesis we show that the media access control (MAC) layer protocol used in 
DOCSIS cable systems make it possible for a DoS attack to successfully degrade a 
network without requiring large amounts of malicious network traffic.  This is especially 
true when the objective of the attack is to reduce the quality of Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) sessions.  Utilizing NS, a discrete event network simulator, we define 
and analyze a DoS attack that specifically targets DOCSIS-based networks.  The attack 
consumes a small portion of the downstream bandwidth available over a cable network 
but can severely impact upstream performance.  This non-intuitive result is possible in 
moderately congested DOCSIS networks.  The attack “chokes” subscribers upstream 
bandwidth by consuming upstream contention request slots. 
 The objective of the DoS attack is to reduce the quality of latency sensitive 
applications such as VoIP.  To effectively achieve the attack objectives, a specific 
number of nodes targeted by the DoS attack at a given intensity (or attack rate) will result 
in network performance that restricts VoIP service on a simulated DOCSIS network 
segment.  The implications of this phenomenon are widespread as end users looking for 
cost-saving voice telecommunications services migrate to VoIP.  
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 In the research presented in this thesis, we define a DoS attack that the following 
properties: 
1. An attacking node located outside of the DOCSIS cable 
network requires a small amount of downstream bandwidth. 
 
2. The attack has an optimal point that minimizes the 
downstream bandwidth consumed but maximizes the damage to 
the target network.  Beyond this point, if the rate of attack 
packets is increased, performance in the DOCSIS network might 
actually improve as the attacked nodes might take advantage of 
piggybacking or concatenation as the network becomes more 
congested. 
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BACKGROUND 
2.1 MAC Overview 
 The media access control layer is a sub layer of the data link layer specified by the 
Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI Reference Model).  This sub layer 
provides addressing and channel access control mechanisms which enable multiple nodes 
on a network to communicate.  MAC protocols are the foundation for network 
architectures and significantly effect the performance of higher level protocols such as 
File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Transfer Control 
Protocol (TCP), and Internet Protocol (IP) [Peyravi, 1999]. 
2.2 Relevant Technologies and Protocols 
2.2.1 ALOHA 
 ALOHA, also known as ALOHAnet, was a technology developed at the 
University of Hawaii in 1970.  Its purpose was to connect various campuses of the 
University spread across the physically separate Hawaiian islands creating a network 
capable of sharing information.  The original implementation utilized a hub-star 
configuration.  The hub broadcast packets on the outbound channels to the client stations.  
The client stations transmitted their data on the inbound channel to the hub.  The hub 
would then retransmit the data it successfully received.  Client stations listened to see if 
their transmission was successful.  If it was not, the client station waited a short period 
and attempted to retransmit.  This mechanism addressed the issue of two client stations 
transmitting at the same time resulting in a collision and subsequent corrupted data.  
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ALOHA is important because, just like Switched Ethernet discussed in section 2.2.2, it 
utilized a shared transmission medium [ALOHAnet, 2007]. 
 Several versions of ALOHA have evolved since its inception in 1970.  Two 
versions important to this thesis are Reservation Aloha (R-Aloha) and Aloha Reservation 
(Aloha-R).  R-Aloha is the simple form of reservation protocols that is based on 
distributed contention.  Stations transmit in time slots with successful transmission 
resulting in implicit reservation of future time slots corresponding to the slot successful 
transmission occurred.  Time slots remain reserved for the same station as long as data 
remains to be sent.  Initial access to the transmission medium is random.  Aloha-R is a 
distributed contention-oriented reservation protocol that utilizes an explicit reservation 
mechanism.  An Aloha-R based frame is divided into equal length time slots.  One of the 
time slots is further divided into mini-slots which are used by stations to request  reserved 
data slots [Peyravi, 1999]. 
2.2.2 802.3 (Ethernet) 
 Ethernet, also known as IEEE 802.3, is a network technology that enables 
multiple stations to communicate over a shared, wired transmission medium.  Original 
implementations of Ethernet utilized coaxial cable transmitting at speeds of 3 Mbps.  As 
Ethernet has advanced over the years, twisted-pair and fiber optic cable have replaced 
coaxial cable and transmission speeds have eclipsed 1 Gbps.  One aspect of Ethernet that 
has remained consistent is its frame format which has enabled the wide range of Ethernet 
implementations to communicate amongst each other. 
5 
 
 
 
 Ethernet's distinctive characteristic which enables multiple stations to 
communicate on the same physical transmission medium is known as Carrier Sense 
Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA-CD).  When a station on an Ethernet 
network needs to transmit, it follows the following algorithm: 
 
1. Ethernet frame ready to transmit. 
2. Is the transmission medium idle? 
3. If yes, begin transmitting. 
4. If no, wait for the transmission medium to become idle 
and then wait the inter frame gap (varies among 
implementations). 
5. Continue to monitor transmission medium to determine 
if collision occurs. 
6. No collision, end successful transmission. 
7. Collision occurs, implement #4 (collision detection 
procedure). 
8. Collision Detection Procedure: 
9. Continue transmitting current transmission to enable all 
stations the opportunity to detect collision. 
10. Has the maximum number of transmission attempts been 
reached? 
11. If yes, abort transmission. 
12. If no, determine random back-off interval and wait that 
amount of time before retransmitting. 
13. Return to #1 and attempt to retransmit. 
 
 
 Another characteristic of Ethernet which is important to our study is the use of 48-
bit addresses to uniquely identify stations on an Ethernet network.  This unique 
addressing enables stations to identify both the source and destination of packets 
transmitted.  Having the source and destination of each packet identified provides 
Ethernet networks the capability to more efficiently route packets to the specific 
destination instead of each station on the network checking the packets.  Ethernet 
networks can also use this addressing scheme to provide an additional layer of security to 
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networks by preventing certain address ranges from injecting traffic into a network 
segment or identifying a specific range of addresses that may be attempting to 
maliciously effect a network. 
2.2.3 802.11 (Wireless) 
 Wireless networks, also known by the protocol they are based on 802.11, provide 
network users the ease of mobility without the hassles of wires and the physical limitation 
of wires.  One could say that 802.11 networks give users the mobility and flexibility that 
wired networks inhibits.  The 802.11 wireless network standard accomplishes this by 
utilizing radio broadcasts operating in the industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) bands 
of the radio spectrum.  Specifically, the 2.4-GHz ISM band and the 5-GHz band are 
utilized by the 802.11 standards.  Within those bands, government regulations constrain 
the power that can be emitted by 802.11 technologies that utilize those radio bands. 
 802.11 networks are comprised of four primary physical components.  Those four 
components are stations, access points (AP), wireless medium, and distribution systems.  
Stations are computing devices that enable users to transfer data between one another via 
wireless network interfaces. Devices called “access points” perform wireless-to-wire 
bridging functions which convert frames on an 802.11 network to another type of frame 
for delivery to the rest of the world.  AP's perform a number of other functions, but 
bridging is considered to be the most important. 
 In order to move data from station-to-station on an 802.11 network, the standard 
uses a wireless medium.  Several physical layers are defined for the wireless medium.  
Two radio frequency (RF) layers and one infrared (IR) layer were initially defined with 
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the RF layers experiencing wider use.  When several AP's are joined together to form one 
large coverage area, each AP must communicate with the other AP's in that coverage area 
to track the movement of stations from one AP to the next.  The distribution system is the 
logical portion of the 802.11 network that forwards the data/frames from the sending 
station to the receiving station.  No specific technology is defined by the 802.11 standard 
for use in a distribution system.  In most commercial uses, some form of bridging engine 
along with the distribution system medium is utilized to transmit data/frames between 
AP's.  The most common term for this part of the network is the backbone network.  The 
most common technology utilized as the backbone network in 802.11 distribution 
systems is the Ethernet technology. 
2.3 DOCSIS 
2.3.1 DOCSIS History and Overview 
 The cable systems that DOCSIS was created for consisted of a head end, 
transmission medium, cable modem termination system (CMTS), and cable modems 
(CM). The head end was where bidirectional frequency division multiplexed (FDM) 
signals originated. Those multiplexed signals would then travel over coaxial cable to 
cable modem termination systems. Eventually, coaxial cable was replaced by fiber optic 
cable between the head end and the cable modem termination systems. Once the FDM 
signal reached the cable modem termination system, it was passed onto a bidirectional 
bus architecture network capable of supporting multiple cable modems. From the cable 
modem termination system to the cable modems, coaxial cable was used as the 
transmission medium. Upstream data (from cable modems to cable modem termination 
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system) utilized higher frequencies for transmission while downstream data (from cable 
modem termination system to cable modems) utilized lower frequencies. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The DOCSIS cable modem protocol stack. The physical layer is 
where modulation of the signal occurs. The cable modem termination system 
adds framing using MPEG-2 transmission convergence protocol enabling 
multiple services to be sent on the same channel. The MAC layer is where 
access to the upstream path is managed.
 
2.3.2 DOCSIS Protocol Stack 
 Figure 2.1 shows a protocol stack as related to DOCSIS at each layer of the OSI 
model. The first four layers are DOCSIS specific. The higher-level protocols (TCP, IP, 
UDP, etc.) are carried by DOCSIS layers across the cable network and are used for 
communications with the Internet [Fellows, 2001]. 
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2.3.3 DOCSIS MAC Layer 
 The DOCSIS media access control (MAC) layer is the focus of this study. The 
MAC layer controls access to the upstream channel of the transmission medium for all 
cable modems. Using the standard client-server model, the upstream channel is the 
network path that carries traffic generated from cable modems (clients) to the cable 
modem termination system (server).  In order for one cable modem to communicate with 
another, access has to be granted by the cable modem termination system for that cable 
modem to place data on the wire. Even if the destination cable modem is located on the 
same local network as the sending cable modem, the cable modem termination system 
has to grant access. Using the client-server model again, the sending cable modem, after 
access has been granted, transmits the data to the cable modem termination system 
(server) which will then transmit the data back down the downstream channel to the 
destination cable modem (client). 
 The request/grant mechanism is implemented via a bandwidth allocation map 
(MAP). Figure  2.2 shows the basic format of a DOCSIS MAP frame. The contention 
slots are used by the cable modems to request access to the upstream channel from the 
cable modem termination system. The data slots are where cable modems insert data after 
access has been granted by the cable modem termination system to the requesting cable 
modem. The maintenance slots are used for initialization and synchronization with the 
channel when a cable modem powers on, and periodically to maintain timing. 
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Figure 2.2. DOCSIS bandwidth allocation map (MAP). The contention slots 
are used by the cable modems to request access to the upstream channel from 
the cable modem termination system. The data slots are used after access has 
been granted to a cable modem to transmit data. The maintenance slots are 
used for initialization and synchronization when a cable modem powers on. 
 
 When a cable modem has data to send, it must wait for the cable modem 
termination system to send a MAP message. It must wait for the MAP because the cable 
modem termination system has not granted that cable modem access to the channel. The 
requesting cable modem will then utilize one of the contention slots of the MAP to 
request a grant from the cable modem termination system to transmit its data. It should be 
noted that the contention slot portion of the MAP can be accessed by any cable modem 
on the local network at any time. Therefore, collisions can occur when two or more cable 
modems request access via the same contention slot. If this occurs, the cable modems that 
experienced the collision will back off a random interval before they attempt to send 
another request. Once the cable modem termination system receives requests, it will 
notify the requesting cable modems in a subsequent MAP which mini-slots they have 
been granted access to for data transmission. This guarantees an interval in which cable 
modems can transmit collision-free.  In order to maximize the available bandwidth in 
DOCSIS-based networks, DOCSIS also allows a bandwidth request to be piggybacked on 
previously granted data slot.  This alleviates the requesting cable modem from having to 
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wait for the next MAP to request bandwidth and improves the efficiency of the upstream 
network channel. 
 DOCSIS also utilizes a mechanism referred to as concatenation in order to 
maximize available bandwidth.  Concatenation allows for a cable modem to combine 
several smaller packets and transmit those combined packets as if they were one.  The 
greatest performance improvement from this mechanism is observed in TCP throughput.  
When concatenation is utilized, multiple TCP ACK packets can be combined (i.e. 
concatenated).  This is possible due to the smaller size of TCP ACK packets compared to 
most other packets.  Rather than separate transmission of individual TCP ACK packets, 
multiple ACKs can be sent in the same DOCSIS frame, maximizing downstream 
throughput. 
 Two other messages that are transmitted by the cable modem termination system 
on the downstream channel that cable modems look for are the upstream channel 
descriptor (UCD) message and the time synchronization message (SYNC). The UCD 
provides the necessary information to the cable modem to determine if its capabilities 
(i.e. frequency range, modulation types, symbol rates, etc.) match that of the upstream 
channel it is attempting to access. The SYNC provides common timing for all modems to 
reference [Fellows, 2001]. 
2.4 Voice over Internet Protocol 
 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is the routing of voice communication traffic 
over the Internet or any Internet Protocol (IP) based network.  The two major competing 
standards for VoIP are the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard Session 
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Internet Protocol (SIP) and the Internet Telecommunication Union (ITU) standard H.323. 
Initially H.323 was the most popular protocol, however it has since been surpassed by 
SIP. This was primarily due to the latter's better traversal of network address translation 
and firewalls, although recent changes introduced for H.323 have removed this advantage 
[“Voice over IP,” 2007]. 
2.5 Denial-of-Service Attacks 
 Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are attempts by a malicious user or group of users 
to render a computer network, system, service, or resource unavailable to its intended 
users. The motive for launching such attacks varies, but the ultimate end-state is the 
inability of legitimate users to conduct normal business due to the unavailable resource.  
There are three basic types of DoS attacks [“Denial-of-Service attack,” 2007]: 
1. Consumption of computation resources, such as 
bandwidth, disk space, or CPU time. 
2. Disruption of configuration information, such as routing 
information. 
3. Disruption of physical network components. 
 
 In a wired network environment, a common DoS attack is a ping flood attack.  A 
ping flood DoS attack overwhelms the targeted system or network with Internet Control 
Management Protocol (ICMP) Echo Request packets (ping).  In order for this attack to be 
effective, the attacker must have a network connection with greater capacity than the 
target network or system.  For example, an attack launched from a Fast Ethernet network 
against a network or system utilizing a DSL connection would be effective.  The Fast 
Ethernet network provides a maximum capacity of 100 Mbps.  The standard DSL 
connection has a downstream capacity of 30 Mbps, but only a 5.12 Mbps upstream 
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capacity.  A ping flood attack from the Fast Ethernet segment would be capable of 
consuming both the downstream and upstream capacity of the DSL connection. 
 Network and system administrators can defend against ping flood DoS attacks. 
Deployment of a firewall can limit or completely deny ICMP echo requests from 
accessing a network or individual system.  This addresses the threat of ping flood DoS 
attacks, but simultaneously inhibits the monitoring of latency by legitimate users (latency 
of a network can be observed utilizing ICMP echo requests). 
 Denial-of-service attacks can be directed at wireless networks just as easily as 
they can at wired.  At the application and transport layer, the attacks are carried out in the 
same manner.  The differences of DoS attacks focused at wireless mediums versus wired 
can be found at the network, MAC, and physical layers.  DoS attacks at the 802.11 MAC 
layer can be categorized into two vulnerability categories: identity and media-access 
control.  Identity vulnerabilities consist of attacks that manipulate the deauthentication, 
disassociation, and transmit power control services.  Media access control vulnerabilities 
consist of attacks that don’t directly manipulate network services provided by the 802.11 
standard, but directly attack the 802.11 protocol. 
 Stations in an 802.11 network implicitly trust the source address provided by any 
station it receives a message from.  This implicit trust is the framework for the 
deauthentication and disassociation DoS attacks in 802.11 networks.  A malicious station 
can spoof a valid station's address and manipulate the deauthentication and disassociation 
services.  When a station joins an 802.11 network, it must associate itself to an AP within 
the network. Prior to association, the AP must authenticate that the station is indeed an 
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authorized user of the network.  The station must send an authentication request to the 
access point.  The AP will respond with an authentication response, validating the request 
and permitting the requesting station to continue with the association process.  The 
station then sends an association request to the access point.  The AP will respond with 
the association response message, completing the association process.  The station is now 
authorized and capable of sending traffic on the network.  A deauthentication attack is 
possible as soon as the association response is sent by the AP to the requesting station.  A 
malicious station, “listening” to the authentication and association messages, spoofs the 
valid stations MAC address.  It creates a deauthentication message using the spoofed 
address, sending the message to the access point. Once the AP receives the message, it 
will respond with a verification of deauthentication.  At this point, the valid station is no 
longer authenticated, and subsequently, not associated to the network.  It will not be able 
to send data on the network until it reauthenticates and reassociates with the access point. 
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Figure 2.3. Message traffic in a deauthentication attack.  A client station sends an authentication 
request.  An access point sends an authentication response.  The client station then sends an 
association request.  The access point sends the association response.  A malicious station at some 
point after association sends a deauthentication response, spoofing the valid client's address.  The 
access point sends the deauthentication response.  During the invalid deauthentication series, the 
client station attempts to send data resulting in an unsuccessful transmission due to the 
deauthentication initiated by the malicious station. 
 
 
 The disassociation attack takes advantage of a similar vulnerability as the 
deauthentication attack.  As stated previously, 802.11 inherently trusts the source address 
of all traffic it receives.  Just as the malicious station in the deauthentication attack spoofs 
the address of a valid station, a malicious station can do the same and initiate the 
disassociation attack.  The distinctive difference between the two attacks is the number of 
messages that are required for a wrongly disassociated station to reassociate.  In the 
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deauthentication attack, it takes four messages for the targeted station to reauthenticate to 
the network.  When a station is successfully targeted by a disassociation attack, it may 
only take two messages to reassociate to the AP (subsequently, the network). 
 The 802.11 standard supports clients to enter a power saving mode in order to 
save energy.  The client enters a sleep state where messages can neither be sent to the 
client nor received.  Prior to entering the sleep state, the client announces to the AP that it 
intends to enter the sleep state so that the AP can begin buffering all traffic destined for 
the client.  While the client is sleeping, it will occasionally “wake up” and poll the AP for 
any buffered traffic.  Once the AP has delivered the buffered traffic to the sleeping client, 
it discards the data in the buffer.  The AP provides a synchronization message that keeps 
the sleeping clients synchronized by sending a broadcast message identifying which 
clients have buffered traffic. 
 One form of a DoS attack via vulnerabilities created by the power save option is a 
malicious station spoofing the polling message of the sleeping client.  A malicious station 
could contact the access point, masquerading as the sleeping client, and poll the AP for 
buffered traffic.  The AP would trust that the poll message is truly from the sleeping 
client, supposedly deliver the traffic, and subsequently discard the traffic under the 
assumption that the traffic was correctly delivered to the sleeping client.  When the 
sleeping client awakens and polls the access point, the AP will no longer have the 
buffered traffic it discarded and the client will not receive the traffic originally intended 
for it.  The client could then return to the sleep state, allowing for this attack to continue 
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as long as the malicious station continues to execute it and the client remained in the 
power save state. 
 A second form of a power save option enabled DoS attack is a malicious station 
spoofing the broadcast message that is sent by the AP which identifies which stations 
have buffered traffic.  The broadcast message is known as the traffic indication map 
(TIM).  By spoofing the TIM message, a malicious station may convince a client that 
there is no buffered traffic for that station when in truth there is.  The client, thinking 
there is no buffered traffic, returns to the sleep state without receiving the buffered traffic.  
Although the buffered traffic is not lost, there is potential for the access point’s buffer to 
reach capacity producing unwanted results (i.e. dropped message traffic). 
 The third form of power save option enabled DoS attack is again spoofing the 
TIM message.  This time, the malicious station can modify the synchronization 
information provided by the TIM so that the clients that receive this message will fall out 
of synchronization with the actual access point, subsequently not waking up at the 
appropriate time.  Just as the previously mentioned TIM attack, a potential negative result 
of this is the capacity of the AP’s buffer maxing out. 
 As network traffic increases, the performance of that network tends to decrease.  
One of the reasons for the decrease in network performance is the collisions that occur 
and the protocols implemented to deal with those collisions.  802.11 networks are no 
different than any other network standard.  Great efforts are made to avoid collisions.  
Unfortunately, a problem that is encountered frequently in 802.11 networks is the hidden 
node problem.  In order to appropriately address the hidden node problem, a combination 
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of physical carrier-sense and virtual carrier-sense mechanisms are employed together to 
manage access to the communications channel.  Both of these mechanisms may be 
exploited by an attacker [Bellardo, 2003]. 
 The physical carrier-sense mechanism employed by 802.11 networks breaks the 
separates the communications channel into four time windows.  For the purpose of this 
paper, we will only discuss the first two time windows which are the Short Interframe 
Space (SIFS) and the Distributed Coordination Function Interframe Space (DIFS).  Prior 
to any frame being sent onto the channel, the sending station must observe the channel 
and ensure that no traffic is being transmitted during one of the time windows.  The SIFS 
window is for frames sent as part of a preexisting frame exchange [Bellardo, 2003].  The 
DIFS window is for stations who wish to initiate a new frame exchange.  The period 
following the DIFS is subdivided into slots to in order to avoid multiple stations from 
transmitting as soon as the DIFS window expires.  The transmitting stations randomly 
select which slot they will transmit in with equal probability of selecting any slot.  If a 
collision occurs, the sending station utilizes an exponential backoff algorithm before 
retransmitting [Bellardo, 2003].  
 A malicious station has the potential to monopolize a communications channel if 
that station sent a short signal at the end of every SIFS window.  This creates a denial-of-
service to all stations on the channel.  The 802.11 contention algorithm is a dual 
persistence algorithm.  A station wishing to transmit data must wait the equivalent of two 
DIFS windows before it can transmit.  If during that window a transmission is sensed 
from another station, the station wishing to send traffic must back off the amount of time 
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determined by the algorithm.  So, a malicious station sending a short signal towards the 
end of every SIFS period would ultimately monopolize the channel, forcing all other 
stations to back off until the attack was over.  Although this attack accomplishes what the 
malicious station wants, it does so with a price.  Since the SIFS window is only 20μs 
long, the malicious station would have to transmit its signal approximately 37,000 times 
per second to occupy the channel which is not very efficient. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Graphical depiction of the virtual carrier-sense attack in 
action.  The gradient portion of the attacker’s frame indicates time 
reserved by the duration field although no data is actually sent.  
Continually sending the attack frames back to back prevents other 
nodes from sending legitimate frames [Bellardo, 2003]. 
 
 The network allocation vector (NAV) is a value maintained by each station on an 
802.11 network that identifies a time period that a station will not attempt to access the 
communications channel despite the channel being assessed as available (empty of 
traffic).  Each 802.11 frame contains a duration field that identifies the number of 
microseconds that the channel is reserved [Bellardo, 2003].  A station will not attempt to 
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transmit until its NAV reaches zero.  The request-to-send (RTS)/clear-to-send (CTS) 
communication exchange that takes place to synchronize two stations attempting to 
communicate on the 802.11 channel explicitly utilizes the NAV to address any hidden 
stations that may be interfering with transmissions on the channel. 
 The RTS/CTS handshake (which is the virtual carrier-sense mechanism) 
implemented by 802.11 to address hidden stations creates a vulnerability that allows a 
malicious station to modify the duration field in an 802.11 frame, making the value in the 
duration field extremely large.  By doing so, the malicious station prevents clients who 
adhere to the virtual carrier-sense mechanism for channel control from accessing the 
channel.  A malicious station has the option of using any frame for its attack, but it is in 
its best interest to utilize an RTS frame since most nodes will always respond to an RTS 
frame with a CTS.  By influencing a good station to respond with a CTS frame, the 
malicious station has reduced the amount of resources it has to utilize to execute the 
attack since the station responding with the CTS will propagate the attack for the 
malicious station.  In comparison to the SIFS monopolization attack, a malicious station 
only has to transmit 30 times a second due to the NAV’s maximum value (32,767 which 
is approximately 32 milliseconds). 
2.6 Security 
 In this thesis, when the topic of security is discussed we are referring to security 
issues as related to protocol implementation rather than physical security of a network.  
Physical access of modern networks is relatively simple given the necessary resources.  
Network and security administrators can easily implement extremely strict or lax security 
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procedures.  What is not easily addressed is the underlying security issues found within 
the protocols that manage how stations that already have physical access to a network 
access the transmission medium. 
2.6.1 802.3 (Switched Ethernet) 
 Securing Switched Ethernet entails applying limited access to data packets.  Since 
Ethernet broadcasts data packets to all stations on its network segment, all stations are 
physically capable seeing those packets.  With a properly implemented security 
mechanism, all stations can still physically see the data packets but are not capable of 
reading or understanding them.  Such a security mechanism is referred to as encryption.  
A drawback of applying encryption to any network is the additional overhead in both 
packet size and processing. 
2.6.2 802.11 MAC Layer 
 Several versions of DoS attacks that can be experienced at the MAC layer in 
802.11 networks were discussed in section 2.5.  The number one countermeasure that 
could be implemented is the explicit authentication of management/control frames.  The 
lone attack that this countermeasure would not be successful against is the SIFS 
monopolization which does not rely on the modification or spoofing of 
management/control frames.  The deauthentication, disassociation, and NAV attacks have 
additional countermeasures that can be implemented beyond explicit authentication.  The 
lone countermeasure for the power save option is explicit authentication.  Although 
countermeasures have been identified for these attacks, the sheer numbers of devices that 
would require modifications has hindered any attempt to implement the countermeasures. 
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 A proposed countermeasure for both the deauthentication and disassociation 
attacks is to delay the AP’s response to such requests.  By delaying the AP’s response 
and subsequently having the AP monitor inbound traffic from the alleged station 
requesting deauthentication or disassociation, an AP can determine whether or not a 
station truly wishes to deauthenticate or disassociate.  If the AP receives inbound traffic 
after a deauthenticate or disassociate request is received, then the AP knows that the 
request is from a malicious station (since the order of receipt is not correct).  
Subsequently, the AP would ignore the request. 
 There are two drawbacks to this countermeasure.  An additional vulnerability is 
created and is observed when a station moves from one AP’s BSA to another.  Due to the 
imposed delay, packets may not be properly routed to the appropriate AP since the old 
AP may still consider the station associated with it.  The second drawback is the 
malicious station could take advantage of the delay when a targeted station truly is 
moving from one BSA to another.  The malicious station could continue to spoof the 
mobile station keeping the association with the spoofed AP valid. 
 A proposed countermeasure for the NAV DOS attack is to place a maximum 
allowable value for the duration field of the 802.11 frame.  This would keep the valid 
stations from being wrongfully denied access to the medium from an invalid duration 
value.  Although this countermeasure addresses the attack, it does not completely 
alleviate it.  All a malicious station would need to do is increase its transmission from 
over 30 packets per second to 90 packets per second.  By doing so, denial of service will 
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be achieved on the network.  Again, the true countermeasure for this attack is explicit 
authentication that would guard against modification of the duration field. 
 Why does explicit authentication not effectively counter the SIFS monopolization 
DOS attack?  The SIFS attack does not rely on the spoofing of addresses in order to 
modify management/control frames to deny service to a network and its users.  A 
malicious station simply has to transmit at the end of the SIFS window, subsequently 
forcing all other stations wishing to transmit to exponentially back off.  The attack is a 
result of the prioritization and ordering standardized by the virtual carrier-sense 
mechanism implemented by the 802.11 standard.  In order to counter this attack, the 
behavior of stations waiting to access the communications channel would have to be 
changed from the current behavior.  Hence, the virtual carrier-sense mechanism would 
have to be modified.
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THE ATTACK DEFINED 
 The research conducted for this thesis entailed simulating a DoS attack launched 
against a DOCSIS network segment from a single malicious node located on the Internet 
side of a cable modem termination system providing connectivity to the DOCSIS 
network segment.  The single node's bandwidth is equal to or greater than the 
downstream service rate of the DOCSIS network segment.  The node does not need 
explicit authorization to the DOCSIS network segment but does have implicit 
authorization via available network monitoring capabilities (i.e. the ICMP echo service). 
 The goal of the DOCSIS attack is to consume the upstream contention slots (refer 
to figure 2.2) with illegitimate bandwidth requests reducing the availability of contention 
request slots for legitimate network traffic.  As the number of upstream contention slots 
available for legitimate requests decreases, the average performance experienced by best 
effort traffic degrades.  Specifically, the number of collisions and the average channel 
access time will increase, the number of packets piggybacked will decrease, and the 
number of contention requests and concatenated packets will increase. 
 The DOCSIS attack we define and evaluate in this thesis is a ping flood.  Figure 
3.1 graphically depicts the architecture of the attack.  The parameters for the attack 
include number of TCP connections, attack rate interval, and number of nodes attacked.  
As figure 3.1 depicts, a node with Internet access launches a ping flood, DoS attack on a 
DOCSIS network.  The rate at which the node attacks the network is labeled RA.  RA is 
defined as the rate at which ICMP echo requests are sent by the attacking node to the 
targeted nodes under attack.  The number of nodes attacked is labeled NA.  NA is defined 
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as the number of nodes in which the attacking node has targeted for the DoS attack.  
These nodes will receive ICMP echo requests at a rate of RA from the attacking node via 
the downstream channel.  Subsequent ICMP echo replies will be sent from the nodes 
receiving ICMP echo requests to the attacking node via the upstream channel. 
 To establish a level of background network traffic, TCP connections are 
established between cable modems on the DOCSIS network segment and a node on the 
Internet side of the cable modem termination system.  Since most DOCSIS networks 
assign unused data slots to be used for contention requests, sufficient background traffic 
must exist to consume the majority of data slots.  In other words, the attack is most 
effective when the network is moderately busy.  In a practical implementation of the 
attack, attack packets will use a spoofed source address 
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Figure 3.1.  Graphical depiction of simulated network general layout.  The attack 
node is located on any network outside of the DOCSIS network.  The nodes labeled 
CM-1 through CM-N do not support any management or monitoring services and 
are “vulnerable” to the DoS attack.  Nodes CM-N+1 to CM-Total support 
management and monitoring services (TCP traffic replicating varying network 
nodes, loss monitor, VoIP monitor).
 
 In a typical wired network based on Ethernet technology, a ping flood DoS attack 
must generate enough network traffic so that all of the available bandwidth is consumed.  
In a DOCSIS network, we anticipate successful DoS without consuming all of the 
available bandwidth (both downstream and upstream).  The rules employed at the MAC 
layer in DOCSIS networks create a phenomenon during a ping flood DoS attack where 
the contention slots are consumed by cable modems that have an ICMP reply packet 
ready for upstream transmission.  This will increase the average channel access time.  
Non-attack network traffic that relies on contention request for upstream bandwidth will 
suffer.  The required available bandwidth between the attacking node and the victim 
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nodes is a fraction of the upstream channel capacity. The attack exploits the inefficient 
upstream data transmission mechanism.  As the intensity of the attack increases, the 
nodes under attack will make use of piggybacking and concatenation which reduces the 
reliance on contention-based requests and therefore offsets the impact of the attack.  The 
attack has an optimal point that reduces the attack rate while maximizing damage to the 
network.
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METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Overview 
 The research described in this thesis uses an open-source, discrete event simulator 
called the network simulator or NS to simulate a DOCSIS network under various network 
loads and attack intensities [NSNAM, 2007].  The simulator configuration is detailed in 
section 4.2.  The simulated model is discussed in section 4.3. 
4.2 Simulator & Network Configuration 
 NS is a discrete event simulator targeted for network research.  NS provides 
substantial support for simulating TCP, routing, and multicast protocols over wired and 
wireless networks [NSNAM, 2007].  Additionally, a module was added to the base NS 
program to provide the capability of simulating a network based on the DOCSIS 
protocol.  Validation of this module is detailed by Martin and Westall in “Validating an 
'ns' Simulation Model of the DOCSIS Protocol” [Martin, 2006]. 
 The network which this thesis is based on is depicted in figure 4.1.  It is actually 
comprised of two distinct networks.  On the left side of figure 4.1 is the wired, wide area 
network (WAN).  It consists of five nodes labeled N2, N3, N4, N5, and L0.  On the right 
side of figure 4.1 is the wired, DOCSIS-based large area network (LAN).  It consists of 
two nodes labeled N1 and L1.  There are also 400 cable modems which are connected to 
node N1.  Both networks are connected via node N0 which is a Cable Modem 
Termination System (CMTS).  All of the links between N0 and the nodes on the WAN-
side of the network represent the Internet.  The link between N0 and N1 represent a 
private network segment provided by a cable service provider. 
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 The WAN-side link settings are as follows: 
Link Type: Duplex 
Maximum Capacity: 100 Mbps 
Queuing Algorithm: Drop Tail 
Propagation Delay: 24 ms 
 
 The DOCSIS network settings are as follows: 
Downstream Channel Rate: 30 Mbps 
Upstream Channel Rate: 5.12 Mbps 
Fragmentation: No 
Concatenations: Yes 
Piggybacking: Yes 
Queue Size: 50 
Contention Slots: 12 
Management Slots: 3 
Map Time: .002 seconds 
Map Frequency: .002 seconds 
Number of Cable Modems:  400 
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Figure 4.1. Network map and configuration settings used as the test network for this 
thesis.  On the left side of the figure is the WAN-side nodes (Internet-residing nodes).  
On the right side are cable modems belonging to the private, DOCSIS-based network.
 
 Sets of simulated runs were devised distinguished by combinations of RA, NA, and 
the number of active TCP connections.  Five variations based on NA were observed: 0, 
10, 50, 100, and 200 nodes under attack.  Each variation of NA was observed with six 
variations of RA: .05, .25, .5, 1, 2, and 4 second intervals between attack packets (longer 
interval = less intense attack).  Within each set, six runs are performed distinguished by 
the number of active TCP connections: 0, 2, 5, 10, 15, and 20 active TCP connections.  
The varying of TCP connections enabled us to observe the network at what would be 
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perceived as average to above average (15-20) and below average (10 or less) loads of 
non-malicious network traffic. 
 To monitor the loss present on the network, a loss monitor (L0) is attached to a 
cable modem on the DOCSIS segment (CM1) with a partner loss monitor (L1) attached 
to a node on the WAN-side network (N2).  These loss monitors exchange packets of size 
210 bytes every .02 seconds, maintaining the loss rate of the network according to their 
packet exchange.  The loss monitor also maintains the necessary statistics for calculating 
the MOS value. 
 As each set was simulated, nine statistics (focus statistics) were isolated to 
observe the effects of varying the variation parameters: aggregate downstream (DS) 
attack packet bandwidth, aggregate upstream (US) attack packet reply bandwidth, mean 
opinion score value, downstream utilization percentage, upstream utilization percentage, 
percentage of upstream packets sent via piggybacking, percentage of upstream packets 
sent via concatenation, percentage of upstream packets sent via contention requests, and 
collision rate. 
 The aggregate downstream attack packet bandwidth is measured in bits per 
second.  It is calculated by multiplying the number of attack packets traced inbound to the 
DOCSIS network segment from the downstream channel by eight (each packet is eight 
bits in size) and dividing that product by the time stamp of the last attack packet received.  
This value represents the portion of the downstream channel's maximum capacity that is 
consumed by the DoS attack. 
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 The aggregate upstream attack packet reply bandwidth is also measured in bits per 
second.  It is calculated by multiplying the number of observed replies from attack 
packets received that are seen outbound from the DOCSIS network segment on the 
upstream channel by eight and dividing that product by the time stamp of the last reply 
transmitted.  This value represents the portion of the upstream channel's maximum 
capacity that is consumed by the DoS attack. 
 The mean opinion score (MOS) value is a numerical representation (1-5) of how a 
media transmission's quality is perceived.  The following list describes each value: 
5—Excellent quality, imperceptible impairment 
4—Good quality, perceptible impairment but not annoying 
3—Fair quality, slightly annoying impairment 
2—Poor quality, annoying impairment 
1—Bad quality, very annoying impairment 
 
 Calculation of the MOS is handled by a loss monitor procedure that was added to 
the NS DOCSIS module.  The procedure utilizes formulas for calculating MOS value 
which are based on computations detailed by Cole in “Voice over IP performance 
monitoring” [Cole, 2001].  When observing VoIP quality and using MOS values to 
determine whether a call is of “toll quality” or not, a minimum MOS value of '4' is the 
telephone industry standard [Miller, 2005].  Depending on which CODEC is used for the 
observed communications channel, MOS values of 3.6 can be considered toll quality 
[Keneipp, 2000].  For the purposes of this thesis, any MOS value less than 3.0 is 
considered less than toll quality. 
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 The downstream utilization percentage is calculated in the NS DOCSIS module 
code.  The code tracks the observed downstream bandwidth consumed, divides that by 
the available downstream bandwidth, and multiplies by 100. 
 The upstream utilization percentage is calculated in the NS DOCSIS module code.  
The code tracks the observed upstream bandwidth consumed, divides that by the 
available upstream bandwidth, and multiplies by 100. 
 The percentage of packets sent via piggybacking and concatenation and the ratio 
of contention requests to total packets sent are all tracked by the NS DOCSIS module.  
All three percentages are calculated by dividing the number of each type observed by the 
total number of packets transmitted, then multiplying by 100. 
 Data to determine the collision rate was captured for three groups of cable 
modems: all cable modems, only the cable modems under attack, and only the cable 
modem supporting the VoIP monitor.  To calculate the collision rates, the number of 
collisions observed for the specified group were divided by the total number of frames 
sent by that group. 
 The configuration of the baseline set for this simulation is zero nodes under attack 
with an attack packet interval of .5 seconds.  This set was run six times with the number 
of active TCP connections increasing as detailed in section three above.  The observed 
focus statistics for this set will be used to compare focus statistics gathered during 
subsequent simulated sets after the variation parameters are changed. 
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ANALYSIS 
5.1 Baseline Results 
 Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 depict the focus statistics observed during the simulation 
of the baseline configuration set.  Figure 5.1 depicts the MOS value.  Figure 5.2 depicts 
the downstream and upstream utilization rate.  Figure 5.3 depicts the percentage of 
packets sent upstream via piggybacking, contention requests, and concatenation.  Once 
two or more upstream TCP connections are active, more user data is transferred than 
periodic management messages.  Figure 3 illustrates that this moves the system to use 
primarily piggybacked requests.  Aggregate downstream and upstream attack packet 
bandwidth is not depicted in a graph due to all occurrence in the baseline configuration 
resulting in zero for both statistics.  Table 5.1 provides actual values of each statistic 
observed during the simulation of the baseline configuration. 
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Figure 5.1. MOS value observed during simulation of baseline configuration.  400 cable 
modems, range of active TCP connections a follows: 0, 2, 5, 10, 15, and 20. 
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Figure 5.2. Downstream and upstream utilization rate observed during simulation of 
baseline configuration.  400 cable modems, range of active TCP connections a follows: 0, 
2, 5, 10, 15, and 20. 
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Figure 5.3. Percentage of packets sent via piggybacking, contention request, and 
concatenation observed during simulation of baseline configuration.  400 cable modems, 
range of active TCP connections a follows: 0, 2, 5, 10, 15, and 20. 
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Table 5.1. Observed focus statistics for simulation of baseline configuration. 
BASELINE CONFIGURATION
Piggy Back Contention Concatenation MOS US UTIL DS UTIL
0 0 0 0.48 99.08 0.44 4.41 5.24 3.23
2 0 0 79.43 17.96 2.61 4.4 49.37 1.76
5 0 0 76.66 15.84 7.5 4.34 50.46 1.82
10 0 0 75.55 12.56 11.89 4.2 50.87 1.96
15 0 0 72.37 10.84 16.79 3.6 51.4 2.11
20 0 0 70.03 9.65 20.33 3.63 51.84 2.25
Number of TCP 
Connections
Aggregate US Attack 
Bandwidth
Aggregate DS Attack 
Bandwidth
 
5.1.1 No Background Traffic (Zero Active TCP Connections) 
 Both the aggregate downstream and upstream attack bandwidth produced by the 
baseline configuration was zero.  was zero.  As shown in Figure 5.1 (with zero active 
TCP connections), the observed MOS value was 4.41.  This value is well above industry 
standards of good quality (MOS value of 4.0).  The downstream utilization was 3.23 
percent.  The upstream utilization was 5.24 percent.  The lower utilization rates are due to 
network traffic being limited to only management and monitoring traffic.  The percentage 
of packets sent upstream via piggybacking was .48.  In order for piggybacking to occur, 
sufficient levels of network traffic must be generated.  If a cable modem is not sending 
data via granted slots, there are no data slots to piggyback.  Therefore, piggybacking 
percentage will be lower and contention request percentage higher.  The percentage of 
packets sent via contention request was 99.08.  Just as piggybacking requires a certain 
level of network traffic, so does concatenation.  The percentage of packets sent via 
concatenation was .44. 
5.1.2 With Background Traffic (Greater than Zero Active TCP Connections) 
 The addition of background traffic (i.e. active TCP connections) produced a high 
MOS value of 4.41 at zero active TCP connections and a low MOS value of 3.6 at 15 
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active TCP connections.  Downstream utilization remained relatively constant ranging 
from 1.76 to 3.23, varying as active TCP connections were increased.  Upstream 
utilization also remained relatively constant ranging from 49.37 to 51.84, increasing in 
conjunction with the increase of active TCP connections (at zero TCP connections, there 
was only an upstream utilization of 5.24).  The percentage of packets sent via 
piggybacking ranged from 79.41 to 69.9, decreasing in conjunction with the increase of 
active TCP connections.  The percentage of packets sent via contention requests ranged 
from 99.08 to 9.65, decreasing in conjunction with the increase of active TCP 
connections.    There was a significant drop from zero to two active TCP connections.  
This behavior can be attributed to piggybacking and concatenation requiring other traffic 
to exist in order to function.  The percentage of packets sent via concatenation ranged 
from .44 to 20.33, increasing in conjunction with the increase in active TCP connections. 
5.2 Impact of Increasing NA 
 NA was increased as follows: 0, 10, 50, 100, and 200.  The maximum of 200 
nodes attacked is equivalent to 50 percent of the cable modems on the DOCSIS segment.  
As NA was increased, the aggregate attack packet bandwidth for both the downstream and 
upstream channel increased.  The increase was relatively constant across the entire range 
observed with both doubling as NA was doubled.  This behavior was expected and is 
graphically depicted in figures 5.4 and 5.5.  The attack packet size is 64 bytes, however 
DOCSIS is required to encapsulate the ICMP message in a 188 byte MPEG frame.  
Therefore, the anticipated downstream attack bandwidth is: 
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Bandwidth =  (NA * 188 * 8 ) / RA 
 
The upstream bandwidth that is consumed is less since the frame size is now 64 bytes 
(plus framing overhead). 
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Figure 5.4. Aggregate downstream attack packet bandwidth, 400 cable modems, .5 second 
attack interval, across the number of nodes attacked (x-axis) in bits per second (y-axis).  
Also graphed is the anticipated bandwidth given the rate of attack. 
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Figure 5.5. Aggregate upstream attack packet bandwidth, 400 cable modems, .5 second 
attack interval, across the number of nodes attacked (x-axis) in bits per second (y-axis). 
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 As NA was increased, the first MOS value below the industry minimum for toll 
quality was observed when ten nodes were attacked with 15 TCP connections present 
(value: 3.58).  The first MOS value below the benchmark established for this thesis was 
seen when 200 nodes were attacked with 20 TCP connections present (value: 1.96).  The 
difference between the MOS value at 200 nodes attacked with 15 TCP connections 
(value: 3.34) and 200 nodes attacked with 20 TCP connections is significant compared to 
all other decreases.  Prior to the observed decrease from 3.34 to 1.96 (delta of 1.38), the 
largest delta was .63 observed between ten and 15 TCP connections while 50 nodes were 
attacked.  Overall, MOS value experienced the most change with 200 nodes attacked, as 
expected.  The observed behavior is graphically depicted in figure 5.6.1.  This is a key 
result which captures the susceptibility to exploitation of the upstream channel in 
DOCSIS systems.  The MOS value dropped by 50% (from 3.58 to 1.96) with only a two 
percent increase in downstream utilization (from 2% to 4%). 
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Figure 5.6.1. MOS value observed with 400 cable modems, .5 second attack interval, 
number of nodes attacked range from zero to 200.  First MOS value observed below the 
thesis benchmark of 3.0 is at 200 nodes attacked with 20 TCP connections active (light 
blue). 
 
 
 Figures 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 depict the behavior of the average collision rate for the 
cable modems under attack and the collision rate for the cable modem supporting VoIP 
monitoring with 15 and 20 TCP connections.  As NA was increased, the average collision 
rate for cable modems under attack gradually increased up to 100 nodes attacked.  
Doubling the nodes attacked from 50 to 100 nodes, a collision rate change of 33 percent 
was observed.  Doubling the nodes attacked from 100 to 200 nodes, a collision rate 
change of over 80 percent was observed.  The same behavior was observed with the VoIP 
cable modem.  From 50 to 100 nodes attacked, the rate change observed was just over 40 
percent.  From 100 to 200 nodes attacked, the rate change was again over 80 percent. 
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Figure 5.6.2. Collision rate (y-axis) for cable modems under attack, 400 cable modems, .5 
second attack rate interval, range of nodes attacked zero to 200 (x-axis).  Over 80 percent 
change in rate from 100 to 200 nodes attacked, 15 TCP connections. 
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Figure 5.6.3. Collision rate (y-axis) for VoIP cable modem, 400 cable modems, .5 second 
attack rate interval, range of nodes attacked zero to 200 (x-axis).  Over 80 percent change 
in rate from 100 to 200 nodes attacked, 15 TCP connections. 
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 As NA was increased, no significant difference in downstream and upstream 
utilization was observed across the range of zero to 200 for NA for 15 and 20 TCP 
connections.  The range of downstream utilization was 2.11 to 4.16, increase observed at 
each increase of NA.  The range of upstream utilization was 51.4 to 58.56, increase 
observed at each increase of NA.  This behavior was expected and is very significant.  
The maximum change in downstream utilization rate was observed between 100 and 200 
nodes attacked, but was a modest 30 percent.  All other changes were just under 20 
percent.  By doubling the number of nodes attacked, we only increased the change in 
downstream utilization rate by 10 percent at the most intense level observed.  
Furthermore, the 30 percent increase only increased the downstream utilization rate to an 
extremely low value of 4.16 percent.  That leaves over 95 percent of the downstream 
bandwidth available for other network traffic and still achieving the desired MOS value 
of under 3.0.  This behavior is observed in figure 5.7. 
 Another significant point observed is the upstream utilization rate.  Just as the 
change in downstream utilization rate was relatively insignificant, so was the change in 
upstream utilization rate.  The range of upstream utilization was from 51.4 to 58.56 
percent.  The change in rate increased with the increase in the number of nodes attacked.  
The significance in this change is the total change in rate was only 14 percent over the 
entire increase of NA.  Just as the benchmark of 3.0 for MOS value was broken without 
overwhelming the downstream channel, the upstream channel retained a relatively large 
portion for non-attack traffic while still achieving DoS of the VoIP service benchmark.  
This behavior is also observed in figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7. Downstream and upstream utilization for 400 cable modems, .5 second attack 
interval, number of nodes attacked range from zero to 200.  Significance observed is the 
extremely low percentage of the downstream channel required to achieve the DoS attack 
objective, as well as, the impact on the upstream channel. 
 
 
 As NA was increased, the observed piggybacking, contention request, and 
concatenation behavior was what was anticipated.  The more nodes targeted by the DoS 
attack produced less packets sent via piggybacking.  This behavior is graphically depicted 
in figure 5.9.  The ratio of contention requests to packets sent increased as NA increased.  
This behavior is graphically depicted in figure 5.10.  The percentage of packets sent via 
concatenation increased as NA increased.  This behavior is graphically depicted in figure 
5.11.  Figure 5.8 graphically depicts the observed behavior for all three metrics for the 
two scenarios (with an attack rate of .5 and the number of upstream TCP connections set 
at 15 and then 20).  The results suggests that less than 15% of the attack packets sent 
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access the transmission channel either via piggybacking or concatenation.  The ratio of 
contention requests to total packets sent for both scenarios is over 50%.  Figure 5.8.1 
depicts the behavior observed strictly of VoIP packets.  Compared to attack packets, 
VoIP packets utilize less piggybacking and more concatenation for improving efficiency. 
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Figure 5.8. Percentage of packets sent via piggybacking, contention requests without 
concatenation, and with concatenation for 400 cable modems, .5 second attack interval, 
number of nodes attacked range from zero to 200.  The observed behavior was in-line 
with what was expected, as the number of nodes attacked increased, the ratio of 
contention requests to total packets sent and packets sent via concatenation increased 
while the number of packets sent via piggybacking decreased. 
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Figure 5.8.1. Percentage of VoIP packets sent via piggybacking, contention requests 
without concatenation, and with concatenation for 400 cable modems, .5 second attack 
interval, number of nodes attacked range from zero to 200.  Compared to attack packet 
behavior, VoIP packets utilize less piggybacking and more concatenation. 
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Figure 5.9.  Percentage of packets sent via piggybacking as the number of nodes attacked 
increased.  400 cable modems, .5 second attack interval, range of nodes attacked from 
zero to 200.  The number of packets sent via piggybacking decreased as the number of 
nodes attacked was increased. 
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Figure 5.10.  The ratio of contention requests to total packets sent as the number of nodes 
attacked increased.  400 cable modems, .5 second attack interval, range of nodes attacked 
from zero to 200.  The ratio of contention requests to total packets sent increased, as 
expected, as the number of nodes attacked increased. 
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Figure 5.11.  The percentage of packets sent via concatenation as the number of nodes 
attacked increases.  400 cable modems, .5 second attack interval, range of nodes attacked 
from zero to 200.  The percentage of packets sent via concatenation increased, as 
expected, with the number of nodes attacked increased. 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
5.3 Impact of Increasing and Decreasing RA 
 RA was increased from the baseline configuration of .5 second intervals between 
attack packets as follows: 1, 2, and 4 seconds.  RA was decreased from the baseline 
configuration of .5 second intervals between attack packets as follows: .25, .05, and .01. 
Each increase in interval doubled the length of the previous interval.  The first decrease in 
interval was half of the baseline configuration, the second decrease equaling a quarter of 
the previous attack interval, and the final decrease twenty percent of the previous 
interval. 
 As RA was increased, MOS value remained above the prescribed threshold value 
of 3.0 for all runs with 15 TCP connections.  As RA was decreased, MOS value dropped 
to less than 1.3 for 15 TCP connections, an attack rate interval of .25 seconds, and 200 
nodes attacked.  A further decrease of RA to .05 seconds resulted in an MOS value of 
2.78 for 50 nodes attacked, 2.53 for 100 nodes attacked, and 1.73 for 200 nodes attacked.  
A final decrease to .01 seconds resulted in an MOS value of 2.6 for 50 nodes attacked 
and less than 1.0 for 100 or more nodes attacked.  These expected behaviors are 
graphically depicted in figures 5.11.1 and 5.11.2.   
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Figure 5.11.1.  Mean Opinion Score (y-axis) for 15 TCP connections, range of nodes 
attacked from zero to 200, and a attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 seconds (x-axis).  
An MOS value less than the threshold value of 3.0 is first observed at 200 nodes attacked 
and an attack rate interval of .25 seconds.  A sub-3.0 MOS value is observed at 50, 100, 
and 200 nodes attacked with an attack rate interval of .05 and .01 seconds. 
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Figure 5.11.2.  Mean Opinion Score (y-axis) for 20 TCP connections, range of nodes 
attacked from zero to 200, and a attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 seconds (x-axis).  
An MOS value less than the threshold value of 3.0 is observed at 200 nodes attacked and 
an attack rate interval of .5 seconds (baseline configuration).  Additionally, sub-3.0 MOS 
values are observed at 100 and 200 nodes attacked with an attack rate interval of .25 
seconds, as well as, 50, 100, and 200 nodes attacked with an attack rate interval of .05 
and .01 seconds. 
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 As RA was decreased over the range of 4 to .01 seconds for runs configured with 
15 and 20 TCP connections, the aggregate downstream attack packet bandwidth 
increased slightly over the 4 to .5 second range.  From .25 to .01 seconds, the increase in 
aggregate downstream bandwidth observed was much higher.  This dramatic change can 
be attributed to the high intensity behavior created by the extremely smaller interval 
between attack packets.   This behavior is graphically depicted in figures 5.12 and 5.13. 
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Figure 5.12.  The aggregate downstream attack packet bandwidth in bits per second (y-
axis) as the attack rate interval is decreased from 4 seconds to .01 seconds (x-axis).  As 
the attack rate interval increases (approaches 4 seconds), downstream bandwidth 
consumes decreases.  As the attack rate interval decreases (approaches .01 seconds), 
downstream bandwidth consumed increases. 
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Figure 5.13.  The aggregate downstream attack packet bandwidth in bits per second (y-
axis) as the attack rate interval is decreased from 4 seconds to .01 seconds (x-axis).  As 
the attack rate interval increases (approaches 4 seconds), downstream bandwidth 
consumes decreases.  As the attack rate interval decreases (approaches .01 seconds), 
downstream bandwidth consumed increases. 
 
 
 As RA was decreased over the range of 4 to .01 seconds for runs configured with 
15 and 20 TCP connections, the aggregate upstream attack packet bandwidth increased 
steadily from 4 to .5 second intervals.  At .25 seconds and faster, the aggregate upstream 
attack packet bandwidth began to decrease drastically for 50 or more nodes attacked.  
This sudden change can be attributed to the complete degradation of the upstream 
channel.  Both attack and non-malicious packets suffered from the abundance of attack 
traffic.  The lone exception is ten nodes attacked.  The aggregate upstream attack packet 
bandwidth for ten nodes attacked actually increased.  It should be noted that despite the 
increase, the MOS value associated with ten nodes attacked and .25 seconds and faster 
attack interval remained above 3.0.  These behaviors are graphically depicted in figures 
5.14 and 5.15. 
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Figure 5.14.  The aggregate upstream attack packet bandwidth in bits per second (y-axis) 
as the attack rate interval is decreased from 4 seconds to .01 seconds (x-axis).  As the 
attack rate interval increases (approaches 4 seconds), upstream bandwidth consumes 
decreases.  As the attack rate interval decreases (approaches .01 seconds), Upstream 
bandwidth consumed increases. 
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Figure 5.15.  The aggregate upstream attack packet bandwidth in bits per second (y-axis) 
as the attack rate interval is decreased from 4 seconds to .01 seconds (x-axis).  As the 
attack rate interval increases (approaches 4 seconds), upstream bandwidth consumes 
decreases.  As the attack rate interval decreases (approaches .01 seconds), Upstream 
bandwidth consumed increases. 
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 As RA was increased from .5 seconds to 4 seconds, both the downstream and 
upstream utilization decreased.  Decreasing the rate from .5 seconds to .01 seconds 
resulted in an increase in both downstream and upstream utilization.  This expected 
behavior is depicted in figures 5.16 through 5.19.  The significance in downstream and 
upstream utilization is not only the direct correlation of increasing RA with decreasing 
utilization, but also the portion of the available downstream and upstream channel 
required for the DoS attack to reach its goal.  Only a minimal portion of the downstream 
channel is required (less than five percent when the first sub-3.0 MOS value is observed) 
and similarly in the upstream channel (just over half of the available upstream channel). 
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Figure 5.16.  Downstream utilization for 15 TCP connections, range of nodes attacked 
from zero to 200, and an attack rate interval range of 4 seconds to .01 seconds.  As the 
attack rate interval was increased (approached 4 seconds), downstream utilization 
decreased.  As the attack rate interval was decreased (approaches .01 seconds), the 
downstream utilization increased. 
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Figure 5.17.  Downstream utilization for 20 TCP connections, range of nodes attacked 
from zero to 200, and an attack rate interval range of 4 seconds to .01 seconds.  As the 
attack rate interval was increased (approached 4 seconds), downstream utilization 
decreased.  As the attack rate interval was decreased (approaches .01 seconds), the 
downstream utilization increased. 
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Figure 5.18.  Upstream utilization for 15 TCP connections, range of nodes attacked from 
zero to 200, and an attack rate interval range of 4 seconds to .01 seconds.  As the attack 
rate interval was increased (approached 4 seconds), upstream utilization decreased.  As 
the attack rate interval was decreased (approaches .01 seconds), the upstream utilization 
increased. 
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Figure 5.19.  Upstream utilization for 20 TCP connections, range of nodes attacked from 
zero to 200, and an attack rate interval range of 4 seconds to .01 seconds.  As the attack 
rate interval was increased (approached 4 seconds), upstream utilization decreased.  As 
the attack rate interval was decreased (approaches .01 seconds), the upstream utilization 
increased. 
 
 
 The collision rate observed behaved as expected, increasing as the attack rate 
interval decreased over the range of 4 seconds to .01 seconds.  This behavior is 
graphically depicted in figures 5.20 and 5.21.  A point of significance is the relatively low 
rate of collisions observed when the first sub-3.0 MOS value is observed (just over 25 
percent rate of occurrence).  Despite the low occurrence of collisions, the DoS attack was 
capable of degrading network performance such that the target MOS was achieved. 
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Figure 5.20.  Collision rate (y-axis) for 15 TCP connections, number of nodes attacked 
range from zero to 200, and attack rate interval range of 4 to .01 seconds.  Decrease in 
attack rate interval results in an increase in collision rate. 
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Figure 5.21.  Collision rate (y-axis) for 20 TCP connections, number of nodes attacked 
range from zero to 200, and attack rate interval range of 4 to .01 seconds.  Decrease in 
attack rate interval results in an increase in collision rate. 
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 As RA decreased over the range of 4 to .01 seconds, the observed ratio of 
contention requests to total packets sent behaved as anticipated increasing over the 
identified range.  This behavior is graphically depicted in figures 5.22 and 5.23.  The 
increase in contention request ratio is related to the increase in collision rate observed 
over the same range.  Each time a cable modem is unable to obtain an upstream slot for 
transmission due to a collision, an additional contention request will be made.  Over the 
range of RA identified, the smaller interval between attack packets results in a more 
intense DoS attack.  With more attack packets sent DS, responding cable modems 
contend for upstream contention request slots resulting in an increase in collisions and 
contention requests. 
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Figure 5.22.  Contention request ratio for 15 TCP connections, number of nodes attacked 
range from zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 seconds.  As the interval 
between attack packets decreases, the number of contention requests required to transmit 
a packet increases. 
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Figure 5.23.  Contention request ratio for 20 TCP connections, number of nodes attacked 
range from zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 seconds.  As the interval 
between attack packets decreases, the number of contention requests required to transmit 
a packet increases. 
 
 
 As RA decreases from 4 to .05 seconds, the percentage of packets that are 
transmitted via piggybacking decreases, as well.  The lone exception once again is 
observed at ten nodes attacked.  Figures 5.24 and 5.25 graphically depict this behavior for 
15 and 20 TCP connections.  The cause of this behavior is related to the relationship 
between increases in contention request ratio and collision rate.  A cable modem may 
attempt to piggyback a request, but due to the increased level of collisions, that request is 
likely to not be granted.  The cable modem will then have to attempt to request future 
data slots via normal contention request slots.  Therefore, a faster attack rate resulting in 
higher collisions not only produces more contention requests but fewer packets 
transmitted via piggybacking.  The ten nodes attacked data point behavior helps explain 
the MOS value remaining above 3.0 despite the previously noted aggregate upstream 
attack packet bandwidth increasing, contrary to other data points. 
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Figure 5.24. Percentage of packets transmitted via piggybacking for 15 TCP connections, 
number of nodes attacked range from zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 
seconds.  As attack rate interval decreases from 4 to .01 seconds, percentage of packets 
sent via piggybacking decreases. 
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Figure 5.25. Percentage of packets transmitted via piggybacking for 20 TCP connections, 
number of nodes attacked range from zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 
seconds.  As attack rate interval decreases from 4 to .01 seconds, percentage of packets 
sent via piggybacking decreases. 
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 As the percentage of packets sent via piggybacking decreases with an increasing 
RA, the percentage of packets concatenated for transmission increases.  Figures 5.26 and 
5.27 graphically depict this behavior. 
 
CONC 15 4 CONC 15 2 CONC 15 1 CONC 15 .5 CONC 15 .25 CONC 15 .05 CONC 15 .01
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
ATTACK: Concatenation
0
10
50
100
200
Number of TCP Connections, Attack Interval
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Figure 5.26.  Percentage of packets transmitted via concatenation for 15 TCP connections, 
number of nodes attacked range from zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 
seconds.  As the attack rate interval approaches .01 seconds, the percentage of packets 
sent via concatenation increases. 
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Figure 5.27.  Percentage of packets transmitted via concatenation for 20 TCP connections, 
number of nodes attacked range from zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 
seconds.  As the attack rate interval approaches .01 seconds, the percentage of packets 
sent via concatenation increases. 
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 Tables 5.2 through 5.7 contain the data statistics relating to channel access with 
15 and 20 TCP connections over an attack rate range of 4 to .01 seconds and number of 
nodes attacked range of zero to 200 nodes.  These tables are graphically depicted and 
discussed in previous figures. 
 
PIGGY BACKING
15 TCP, 4 Sec. 15 TCP, 2 Sec. 15 TCP, 1 Sec. 15 TCP, .5 Sec. 15 TCP, .25 Sec. 15 TCP, .05 Sec. 15 TCP, .01 Sec.
0 3.49 3.43 3.43 3.44 3.43 3.44 3.39
10 3.38 3.33 3.39 3.3 3.54 1.79 16.99
50 3.22 3.14 3.04 3.19 3.65 1.5 1.76
100 2.74 2.86 2.74 2.87 3.15 0.93 0.21
200 2.64 2.49 2.18 2.36 2.1 0.5 0.06  
Table 5.2.  Piggybacking data for 15 TCP connections, number of nodes attacked from 
zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 seconds. 
 
PIGGY BACKING
20 TCP, 4 Sec. 20 TCP, 2 Sec. 20 TCP, 1 Sec. 20 TCP, .5 Sec. 20 TCP, .25 Sec. 0 TCP, .05 Sec0 TCP, .01 Sec
0 2.58 2.58 2.63 2.62 2.59 2.61 2.57
10 2.61 2.52 2.57 2.62 2.92 1.48 14.57
50 2.45 2.34 2.39 2.71 3.33 1.28 1.25
100 2.3 2.21 2.27 2.43 3.1 0.9 0.21
200 2.14 1.98 2 2.04 2.09 0.45 0.06
 
Table 5.3.  Piggybacking data for 20 TCP connections, number of nodes attacked from 
zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 seconds. 
 
 
Table 5.4.  Contention request ratio data for 15 TCP connections, number of nodes 
attacked range from zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 seconds. 
CONTENTION REQUEST RATIO
15 TCP, 4 Sec. 15 TCP, 2 Sec. 15 TCP, 1 Sec. 15 TCP, .5 Sec. 15 TCP, .25 Sec. 15 TCP, .05 Sec. 15 TCP, .01 Sec.
0 52.17 51.94 51.96 52.25 52.07 52.21 52.06
10 52.24 52.32 52.06 52.46 52.73 56.37 54.32
50 52.45 52.79 53.12 54.02 55.42 74.45 77.6
100 53.33 53.57 54.59 56.08 60.2 81.44 84.53
200 54.16 55.15 57.51 62.35 68.41 85.76 89.25
61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5. Contention request ratio data for 20 TCP connections, number of nodes 
attacked range from zero to 200, attack rate interval range from 4 to .01 seconds. 
CONTENTION REQUEST RATIO
20 TCP, 4 Sec. 20 TCP, 2 Sec. 20 TCP, 1 Sec. 20 TCP, .5 Sec. 20 TCP, .25 Sec. 0 TCP, .05 Sec0 TCP, .01 Sec
0 52.37 52.44 52.39 52.47 52.67 52.75 52.63
10 52.44 52.7 52.63 52.9 53.08 55.79 56.58
50 52.84 53.31 53.39 53.97 55.22 73.72 78.66
100 53.46 53.89 54.77 56.46 59.02 81.46 84.74
200 54.5 55.41 57.11 60.74 66.68 86 89.53
 
 
Table 5.6.  Concatenation data for 15 TCP connections, number of nodes attacked range 
from zero to 200, attack rate interval from 4 to .01 seconds. 
CONCATENATION
15 TCP, 4 Sec. 15 TCP, 2 Sec. 15 TCP, 1 Sec. 15 TCP, .5 Sec. 15 TCP, .25 Sec. 15 TCP, .05 Sec. 15 TCP, .01 Sec.
0 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.37
10 0.26 0.3 0.37 0.55 1.36 5 13.82
50 0.32 0.46 0.83 1.78 4.04 7.93 15.82
100 0.42 0.68 1.37 3.22 6.22 8.8 12.39
200 0.56 1.09 2.49 4.98 9.47 10.33 9.44
 
CONCATENATION
20 TCP, 4 Sec. 20 TCP, 2 Sec. 20 TCP, 1 Sec. 20 TCP, .5 Sec. 20 TCP, .25 Sec. 0 TCP, .05 Sec0 TCP, .01 Sec
0 0.23 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.4
10 0.24 0.3 0.4 0.62 1.33 4.54 13.61
50 0.35 0.54 1.02 1.93 4.1 9.38 15.35
100 0.43 0.79 1.65 3.51 6.9 8.87 12.19
200 0.63 1.31 2.77 5.67 10.08 10.32 9.21  
Table 5.7. Concatenation data for 15 TCP connections, number of nodes attacked range 
from zero to 200, attack rate interval from 4 to .01 seconds.
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CONCLUSION 
 The data produced from the simulation supports all of our preliminary 
expectations.  As the number of nodes attacked by a ping flood DoS attack on a DOCSIS 
network segment is increased, the upstream channel is "choked" by attack traffic 
contention requests.  Additionally, access to the upstream channel is limited due to the 
increase in collisions which further increases the contention request ratio.  Furthermore, 
as the interval between attack packet transmissions is decreased, the percentage of 
packets accessing the upstream channel via piggybacking decreases while packets 
accessing the same channel via concatenation increases. 
 The increase in contention requests and decrease in packets transmitted via 
piggybacking degrade network performance such that VoIP transmission quality is below 
an acceptable MOS value of 3.0 with several combinations of NA and RA.  The 
relationship between the various combinations is the smaller the interval defined by RA, 
the smaller the amount of nodes targeted for attack defined by NA.  Subsequently, the 
DoS attack defined and analyzed in our research  supports the theory that in DOCSIS 
networks, the attack requires only a small portion of the available downstream bandwidth 
in order to severely impact upstream performance, especially when the focus of the attack 
is best effort VoIP sessions. 
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APPENDIX 
 All files associated with this thesis, as well as a "snapshot" of the NS simulation 
environment, are on the compact disc included with this manuscript.  On the compact 
disc, if you navigate to the directory ./ns-cpsc854/project-docsis/, you will be in the home 
directory for all simulations performed for this thesis.  The directory ./GoRuns contains 
all of the goruns.dat files used for configuring each simulation run.  The directory 
./thesisData contains all of the data files in tar.gz form for all simulations performed 
during our research.  To locate specific data results, the directories in ./thesisData are 
organized with the following naming convention: set4X_Y where X is the number of 
nodes attacked and Y is the attack rate interval.  The sets for .5 second attack rate have no 
Y value (i.e. set400 would be zero nodes attacked with an attack rate interval of .5 
seconds). 
 To recreate the results, a sample script would go as follows: 
./cleanHouse 
./prepRun 0_4 
./goCPRruns.script 400_4 & 
 
 The above script would cleanup all unnecessary files, copy all goruns.dat files 
required for a run with zero nodes attacked with a four second attack interval into the 
appropriate directories, and execute the simulation for those runs saving the results in 
tar.gz form in the ./thesisData/set400_4 directory.  The naming convention is simply 
'number of nodes attack' and 'attack interval' separated with an underscore.  Consolidated 
data is then placed in a file named data_set400_4.out.
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